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Summary and conclusions 
In  1992  the  Commission  adopted  a  report  on  the · implementation  of the  Council 
Resolution  of 22 July  1975  (SEC(92)79 final)  and,  after  examining  that  report,  the 
Council  adopted  a Resolution  on  18 June 1992  on  the  various  measures  taken  by  the 
Commission on the technological problems of nuclear safety.  This Resolution  updates 
and  reinforces  the Community's role in  the light of one of the key  aspects  of safety, 
namely the awareness at the end of the 1980s of a small but not negligible probability of 
severe accidents which could have repercussions throughout the world  .. 
The  Council  Resolution  of  22 July  1975  committed  the  Member  States  and  the 
Commission  to a process of gradual  harmonization of Community safety practices and 
rules.  The Resolution of 18 June 1992,  while confirming the objectives of the earlier 
Resolution, recommends that cooperation between the Community's safety authorities be 
stepped up and that the know-how and experience gained by the European Community 
should  be transferred  to  the countries of Central  and  Eastern  Europe and  the former 
Soviet Union.  At the beginning of 1993  it can be said that  the first  measures  towards 
achieving the latter objective are going in the right direction.  As regards the measures 
undertaken since 1975 in the Community, in a climate largely adverse to the development 
of nuclear  energy,  harmonization  of nuclear  safety  practices  and  rules  in  Europe  is 
progressing satisfactorily. 
The fundamental objective of establishing a safety system which guarantees protection of 
the public and the environment against the risks arising out of the use of nuclear energy 
is  being  achieved  with  the  aid  of two  Community  working  groups  set  up  by  the 
Commission.  One of them, the Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG), brings together 
representatives  of all  the organizations  involved in  the  safety  of installations:  power 
station  suppliers,  electrical  utilities,  safety  authorities  and  their  technical  support 
organizations;  the other,  the Nuclear  Regulators'  Working  Group  (NRWG)  consists 
solely of the representatives of  safety authorities.  Representatives of the Swedish, Finnish 
and,  more recently, Swiss counterpart organizations also sit on  these two Committees. 
The safety system gradually being established focuses on three aspects:  organization of 
safety, in particular at public authority level, the methods used  to assess it and technical 
regulations. 
Considerable progress has been made on the organization of safety which is fairly 
advanced and a recent report entitled  "Objectives and requirements of a nuclear 
safety regulatory regime"  gives a fairly  complete overview of the piinciples on 
which there is a European consensus. 2 
As  regards  the  methods  of evaluating  safety,  the  report  COM(88)788  entitled 
"Assurance of the safety of nuclear power plants -Objectives and methods"  will 
aJso, once it has been updated to take account of the problem of severe accidents, 
be an almost complete consensus document. 
The situation  is  a  complex one as  regards  technical  regulations  because of the 
different  hierarchies  of regulations,  which  sometimes  require  initiatives  from 
industrial  responsibles,  and due to the very broad range of problems to  be taken 
into account in the various phases involved with a nuclear power station, such as 
the choice of site,  its  design,  commissioning,  operation  and  decommissioning. 
The  1981  docum~:nt entitled  ".Safety  principles  for  light-water-reactor  nuclear 
power plants"  (COM(81)519 final)  was  an  important  milestone,  however,  by 
establishing  a  list  of  fundamental  principles  and  general  safety  principles 
recognized at Community level, and it mapped out future action concerning safety 
requirements and codes and  standards.  The 1988 document  "Assurance of the 
safety of nuclear power plants -Objectives and methods" shows that the levels of 
safety achieved in Community countries are practically equivalent, and points out 
the areas,  notably severe accidents,  where progress still  needs to  be made. 
In  1992 two events had  a significant impact on  the Commission's activities in  the  field 
of safety:  one  inside  the  Community,  the  prospect  of the  single  market  in  1993, 
reactivated  the  process  of  harmonizing  safety  requirements  to  be  met  by  future 
generations of power  stations;  the  other outside  the  Community,  in  the  form  of the 
gradual  implementation  of the  PHARE and  TACIS  programmes  of assistance  to  the 
countries  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union,  brought  the 
attention of those responsible for safety in  the Community to  the problems presented  by 
the  East and  brought  about  greater  cohesion  and  large-scale  collaboration  with  their 
counterparts in  the countries of the East. 
At European level, the opening of frontiers  to  the free  movement of nuclear equipment 
and above all  the opening  up of public contracts to  free  intra-Community competition 
along  with  initiatives  taken  by  third  countries  and  in  particular  the  USA  to  develop 
innovative plants with  improved safety  features  compared  with  the  present  ones,  have 
prompted the two main European constructors and operators to pool their know-how tor 
a project that can be approved in  their two countries.  This  project will  conform to the 
fundamental principles of safety indicated above, but with the additional factor of severe 
accidents  taken  into  account  from  the  design  stage.  As  regards  safety  options  and 
requirements  as  well  as the rules  and  criteria to  be applied,  the  two constructors  and 
operators  will  take joint decisions  from  the  earliest  design  stage  which  will  then  be 
gradually submitted  to the safety authorities.  At present this  project is  denoted by  the 
acronym EPR (European Pressurized Reactor).  It is  reasonable to hope that the various 
parties responsible for nuclear safety in other European countries will also gradually come 
in  on the act.  The Commission will  in any case try  to help this evolution, the issue of 
which eventually leading the concepts of equivalence and  harmonization  to be replaced 
by common rules. 
Following the political upheavals in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the 
West's realization of the problems presented  by  the safety of nuclear power stations in 
those countries, one of the main concerns of the Council and the Commission was for the 
urgent  practical  assistance  provided  by  the Community under  the  PHARE and TACIS 3 
programmes to  be accompanied by a real  transfer of the approach  to safety,  methods, 
practices,  rules and criteria applied by the Community to  help the countries of the East 
gradually  to  bring  the safety  of their installations  up  to  an  equivalent  level  to  that of 
·European installations.  The Commission,  which does  not  wish  to  limit this  objective 
solely  to  existing  plants  but  also  to  future  generations  of plants,  has  recently  taken 
significant steps in  this direction, in  the form of a joint study between, on the one hand, 
the  constructors  and  technical  support  organizations  of  the  Community's  safety 
authorities, coordinated by EDF and GRS and, on the other, their Russian counterparts. 
This is  a joint Community-Russian study of how to  improve safety  in  the  main  reactor 
systems,  the  principal  objective being  to  identify joint  measures  which  could  help  to 
accelerate  this  improvement  and  have  an  impact  on  the  future  of nuclear  energy  in 
Europe.  This analysis  will  also provide support  for  a  vast operation of technological 
transfer  to  the  Russian  industry,  safety  evaluation  establishments  and  research  and 
development institutes so that European know-how can  help  future  Russian  projects. 
The  contacts  established  at  the  end  of  1990  between  the  safety  authorities  of  the 
Community Member States, as represented in  the NRWG, and their counterparts in  the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union rapid I  y led in  1991 
to the Commission's establishing  "CONCERT" (Concertation on European  Regulatory 
Tasks)  for  the  purposes  of developing  cooperation  between  Community  and  Eastern 
European safety authorities, the aim being to take advantage of the concertation structures 
established in  the West in  the NRWG to optimize cooperation.  The three areas proposed 
for joiryt activities were as follows:  regulatory bases and procedures,  regulatory aspects 
of technical  and  operational  problems  and  on-going assistance  programmes.  It· soon 
became clear that the transfer to these Eastern  European  countries of experience gaincti 
by the Community in  terms of organization, procedures and regulations had to he one of 
the  essential  aspects  of assistance  to  Eastern  countries  on  nuclear  safety.  At  the 
prompting  of  the  NRWG  the  Commission  set  up,  at  the  beginning  of  llili2,  the 
"Regulatory  Assistance  Management  Group"  (RAMG)  in  support  of the  CONCERT 
structure and consisting of the safety authorities belonging to  the NRWG willing to lend 
their  support  to  their  counterparts  in  Eastern  Europe  as  part  of technical  assistance 
programmes financed by the Community.  The RAMG supervises assistance activities and 
advises the Commission on proposals made in  this area.  More particularly,  its job is  to 
define, organize and implement support for the regulatory authorities in  the countries of 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union,  to  help  the  Commission 
establish a  regional assistance programme for  those countries,  to advise it on  requests 
emanating from the beneficiary countries so as  to maximize the benefits and  to examine 
and evaluate the results of the assistance programmes. 
To solve the  problems  concerning  assistance  to  the  countries  of Central  and  Eastern 
I  ~uropc and the l{mun Soviet Union,  viz.  operational  safety,  dl'sign  safety,  support  for 
safety  authorities,  to  meet  a  huge  demand  and  to  guarantee  the  beneficiary  countries 
consistent aid across  the board in  terms of safety,  the Commission  has encouraged  the 
bringing  together  of the  European  organizations  called  upon  to  provide  assistance: 
electrical  utilities  (TPEG),  safety  authorities  (RAMG)  and  their  support  organizations 
(TSO), and the constructors of power stations (ENAC).  The collaboration between these 
consortia is extremely fruitful and the projects run  provide European organizations with 
a unique opportunity for practical harmonization on a joint basis.  While all  the activities 
run by the Commission were designed to harmonize safety practices and rules at European 
level by way of a more or less abstract process of discussion and  comparison of national 4 
pos1t1ons  the  implementation  of assistance  projects  gives  European  organization.-;  tilL' 
opportunity  to  apply  the  results  of Community  cooperation  to  the  beneficiaries  of 
assistance.  Concertation and cooperation, which is established pragmatically between the 
partners jointly responsible for one and the same project can only,  in  the long-term, be 
to the benefit of  Community action, whose success is indirectly furthered by the assistance 
programmes. 
This favourable context for the Commission's intended policy, with projects carried out 
jointly in  the  frame of EPR as  weJI  as  in  assistance  programmes,  will  have  a certain 
knock-on effect at Community level which will gradually bring the safety authorities of 
the Member States, the TSOs, electrical utilities and power plant .suppliers to discus.s and 
come to an  agreement on the specific safety problems presented  in  the  Member States, 
be  they  problems of the design  safety of installations,  operational  safety  or approval. 
This trend will  strengthen cohesion and solidarity  between those parties responsible  for 
safety  within  the Community and  make  for  better acceptance of nuclear energy  by  the 
public at large. 
Thus,  a  complex  process  of consultation,  discussion  and  concenation  which  has  been 
conducted  for  more  than  twenty  years  will  gradually  lead  to  a  safety  system  which  is 
recognized on a broader international scale than  the Community and  in  particular in  the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Absolute safety, 
however,  is as utopian an objective as absolute health.  Safety can always be improved 
and at a time when technological progress is practically non-stop this has to be a constant 
objective of  the authorities who must ensure that sufficient resources are available and put 
to proper use.  Community concertation on existing installations must take account of the 
results of research as long as there are objective reasons  for engaging in  it.  As  regards 
the future generations of power plants,  technological  innovation  will  always  have  to  be 
examined in  terms of safety and for the benefit of safety. 
Over and  above  the  system  of safety  being  developed  the  final  objective  will  be  to 
establish a genuine safety culture at Community level and to project it throughout Europe. TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF SAFETY CRITERIA 
AND REQUIREMENTS RECOGNIZED TIIROUGIIOUT 1'1/E COMMUN/1')' 
AND A GENUINE SAFETY CULTURE THROUGHOUT EUROPE 
Report on the implementation of the 
Council Resolutions of 22 July 1975 
and 18 June 1992 on the 
technological problems of nuclear safety 
I Technological problems of nuclear safety 
In  1992  the  Commission  adopted  a  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the  Council 
Resolution of 22 July  1975 (SEC(92) 79 fina1),  and  the Council,  after examining that 
Report, adopted a resolution on 18 June 1992 on the various activities carried out by the 
Commission on the technological problems of nuclear safety.  The Commission Report 
referred to the period 1987-91 while the reference period for the Council Resolution was 
1991,  which  is  why it  was  worth  looking to sec whether the various objectives of the 
Council  Resolution  tied  in  with  the current situation at the  beginning of 11)9J.  Befurl: 
going into the individual points of the resolution,  it is  worth taking a  bnef look at  how 
the nuclear energy situation has changed in  the world both economically and politically 
since  1991,  at the  principal events  inside  and  outside  of the  Community  which  have 
affected the activities of the Commission and at the results obtained on the technological 
problem's of nuclear safety. 
1991  saw a cutback in  nuclear plant construction programmes in  countries regarded as 
being in favour of  nuclear energy (France, Japan, USA), a de facto or de jure moratorium 
in  a lot of countries (Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,  United Kingdom, Germany, 
Belgium, etc.) and poor export prospects  for European compa11ies.  This situation  was 
relieved to some extent by the abundance of fossil  fuels available at relatively stable low 
prices (oil from the Middle East, gas and coal from the countries of Eastern  Europe and 
the former Soviet Union) and by  the obsession  with  the worrying  state as  regards  the 
safety  of nuclear  power  stations  in  operation  in  Eastern  European  countries  and  the 
former  Soviet  Union,  which  had  a  negative  influence  on  public  opinion  in  western 
countries.  In  1992 the preliminary studies on the EFR (European Fast Reactors) project 
were practically completed and  no decision  was taken  to restart  the Creys-Malville  fast 
breeder reactor. 
With public opinion beginning to realise the negative effects on  the environment caused 
by fossil  fuels,  investments in  the nuclear field could pick up in  the medium term.  That 
said,  how  studies  on  the impact on  the environment of fossil  fuels  are  interpreted  is 
sometimes contradictory and  public opinion in  Europe  has  not yet  taken  on board  the 
enormous rise in  the demand for energy in  Asia. 
At the beginning of 1993 the general situation is still  fairly gloomy. 
The situation as regards the safety of installations is  completely different.  The political 
will  to keep improving the safety of existing installations has not let  up and  in  Western 
countries the parties responsible for running nuclear programmes (safety regulators, plant 
suppliers,  utilities and research organisations) feel  that safety is  absolutely essential and 
comes hcfore any economic considerations. 
In  1992  two events had  a significant impact on  the activities of the Commission  in  the 
field of safety:  one inside the Community, this  being the opening of the single market 
in  1993, which restarted the process of harmonizing the safety requirements to be met by 
future generations of power stations;  and the other outside the Community, in  the form 
of the gradual implementation of the PH  ARE and TACIS programmes of assistance to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which brought the 
attention of the various parties responsible for satety. in  the Community to the problems presented  in  the (2st and had  the effect of stepping up cohesion and  collaboration  with 
th'eir  Eastern  counterparts.  It is  in  this general context that the individual  terms of the 
Council Resolution of 18 June 1992  should be viewed to  see how the Commission  has 
taken  them  into account in  implementing its  policy.  The significance of Commission 
action  ,  the  means  employed  to  encourage  systematic  concertation  between  national 
bodies,  the requisite scientific and technical bases,  and the extension and projection of 
measures taken beyond the boundaries of the Community to encompass the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will thus be looked at one after 
the other. 
I.Significance of Commission action 
The Council  "reco~ni.\·es the  pro~  res.\'  towards an  t~quivafent and sati.~fiJctory  d('~f"('('  l~/ 
protection of tht•  population  and of  the  environment  in  !he  Community  m  thl'  luxhesr 
practical safety levels, as stipulated by tht• Resolution of I 975,  and in comrihwing to rhc 
inllmzational tu·n·ptam:e of  .\·imilar  hi~h safety  lew~  Is". 
The Commission action concerning the technical and regulatory aspects of reactor safety 
generally  forms  part  of the  "harmonization  of safety  rules  and  criTeria".  The  term 
harmonization is  not always the best to describe Community action.  Sometimes it  could 
be replaced by the idea of search for equivalence, but at this stage a difference should be 
made between installations being built or in  operation and  future  generations of power 
stations.  As regards the former, the method used from the outset to implement the  1975 
Council  Resolution  has  been  to  promote  systematic  concertation  between  the  various 
parties  responsible  for safety  in  the Member States,  safety  and  regulatory  authorities, 
electrical  utilities operating the installations and suppliers  within  Commission  working 
groups in  order to reach a consensus on the equivalence of approaches,  methodologies, 
options  and  safety  rules  and  criteria  applied  in  the  Member  States.  This  policy  is 
adopted, as will be seen below, in very many areas.  A list of the fundamental principles 
of safety, as accepted and applied de facto throughout the Community,  was established 
in  1981, this being less  the result of harmonization between the  respective positions or 
· the Member States than  the adoption of a common position  to  be  checked a  posteriori 
against existing  installations.  In  1989  the Commission  Communication to  the Council 
"A.\·surana of  th£•  safny of  nuclear power plants - objectives and merhod.\"  (COM(l·H~) 
788) described the safety objectives and  methods on  which general  wnsensus had  lw~..·u 
established within the Community. 
As  regards the future generations of nuclear power plants,  the prospects of Community 
action  are  rather  different.  At  European  level  the  opening  of frontiers  to  the  free 
movement of nuclear material and above all the opening of public contracts to open intra-
Community competition along with initiatives taken  in  third countries and  in  particular 
in the USA to develop innovative plants with improved safety features compared with the 
present ones have prompted the two main plant suppliers and electrical utilities in  EuropL' 
to pool their know-how into a project that can be approved in  both their countries.  This 
type of project ties in with the basic safety principles mentioned above, with the severe 
accidents scenario added as from the design stage, and the safety options, requirements, 
rules and criteria to  be applied take the form,  from  the earliest  stage of the  project,  of 
joint decisions by the two constructors and generators;  these arc then gradually submitted 
to  the  safety  authorities.  This  project  currently  has  the  acronym  EPR  (European 
Pressurized  Re<tctor).  It is  to he hoped that the various parties involved in  nuclear safety 8 
in the other European countries will also gradually join in this process.  The Commission, 
for its part, wil1  make every effort to facilitate this trend,  which should sec the concepts 
of equivalence and harmonization replaced by common rules. 
If the basic principles which apply to all types of reactor are the top of the nuclear rules 
hierarchy,  followed  by the safety options and  requirements,  rules  and  criteria,  which 
depend  greatly  on  the  design  of  the  plant,  at  the  bottom  of  the  list  come  the 
manufacturing and control codes and standards of components of nuclear plants,  which 
arc used  by the suppliers in particular to  guarantee the integrity or steel components for 
the life of the installations.  The Commission's work in the tield of codes and standards, 
which was initially geared to fast breeder reactors,  has gradually shifted towards light 
water reactors.  This is pre-normative work intended to establish the technical bases of 
a  harmonized  approach  prior  to  the  development  of  European  industrial  codes. 
Implementation of the EPR project gives a new dimension to this work.  The codes and 
standards  used  to  design  and control  the components  of future  EPR-type  plants  will 
obviously have to have a European label.  It is  hard to imagine the Commission setting 
about developing a complete set of codes and standards since this would be too much of 
a  task  and  in  some ways superfluous,  given  the  time and  effort already  invested,  for 
example, in  France with the RCCM code, in  Germany with the KT  A standards or in  the 
USA  with the ASME code.  The priority will be more to establish  equivalence between 
certain specific parts of the various codes and standards.  This process has already been 
set in  motion and it should be systematically pursued.  The next stage would be to draw 
up a  manual setting out the full  set of codes and standards needed to construct an  EPR-
type plant.  This  would  be  made  up of the  various  existing  codes,  which  would  be 
approved at Community level and be supplemented, where necessary, by codes developed 
at  European  level  or  existing  codes  which  have  been  improved  or completed.  The 
promoters of the EPR project need to achieve such ambitious objectives.  This is  for the 
industry to develop, but Community work in codes and standards is essential to a coherent 
overall  plan,  to  support for specific studies and  to  the guarantee of a  European  label 
involving the parties concerned in all the Member States.  In  199:1  the Commission plans 
to commit substantial  funding in  order to accelerate this process. 
II.Means employed:  Consultation and cooperation extended to all parties in~olved 
in nuclear safety 
The  Council  "encourages  the  Commission,  national  safety  authorities,  institutions 
specialized in  nuclear safety evaluation,  research and development institutions,  nuclear 
utilities and manufacturers  in  the Community to continue to  participate actively  in  the 
well-established and continuing process of consultation and cooperation,  in  the context 
ofthe 1975  Resolution". 
Consultation and cooperation are actively pursued in  the Reactor Safety Working Group 
(RSWG) which brings together representatives of the safety authorities and their technical 
support organizations,  plant operators and manufacturers.  Swedish and Finnish experts 
participate in  the work of the RSWG as observers.  In  1992, at the end of its  four-year 
work  programme  (1988-92) this  Group  looked  at  its  working  methods,  the extent lo 
which  it  had  completed  ils  activities  in  the  1988-92  work  programme  and  the  new 
directions its work should take for the period  1992  to  1996. The Group noted  that in  terms of working methods high priority  had  been  given  to an 
exchange  of information  on  the  situation  in  the  various  Community  countries,  on 
significant events as regards safety, and on probabilistic studies and that from  this point 
of view the Group provided a  unique and active forum  in  which the safety authorities, 
operators and constructors could share their experiences.  The RSWG felt that the use of 
working  parties,  task  forces,  study contracts  and  in-depth discussion  of the  attendant 
documents made for an effective means of achieving consensual  harmonization.  It also 
felt that its work should result in  more publications. 
The RSWG noted that all  the activities scheduled in  1988 had  been  undertaken and that 
some had been completed;  others had to be pursued, notably on existing safety margins, · 
severe accidents, probabilistic methods,  the principles of safety and codes and standards 
for  advanced  reactors.  These  are  the  areas  on  which  the  RSWG  thinks  it  should 
concentrate its efforts for the period 1992-96.  This does not represent any great change 
over the previous line of action  which  took account of the degree of harmonization as 
spell out in a  1987 consensus document and the effects of the Chernobyl accident on  the 
approach  to  safety,  except that  it  adds general  trends,  such  as  the  situation  of power 
plants in  Eastern  European countries and the opening of the single  market.  The trends 
towards  more  universal  safety  objectives  and  criteria  to  include  Eastern  European 
countries present an  excellent reason  for stepping up activities and drawing conclusions 
in  key  areas  such  as  severe  accidents,  safety  margins  evaluation  and  probabilistic 
methods. 
A  brief look  will  be  taken  at  the  main  activities  undertaken  in  the  previous  work 
programme as regards the abovementioned priorities which need to be continued and at 
the new measures resulting from  the plan approved in  1992 for the period  1992-96. 
As  part of the assessment of safety  margins a number of benchmarks provided a set  of 
hypothesis  and  realistic  data  on  the  release  of fission  products  and  the  radiological 
consequences of a design basis accident, i.e. a sudden rupture of a main  primary circuit 
pipe in  a  pressurized  water reactor.  The same exercise is  pursued  in  the same manner 
for steam generator tube rupture accidents.  A new study will  be undertaken to evaluate 
existing margins for containment in  the event of a severe accident.  This will  be one of 
the  points to  be taken  into account in  an  updated  report on  the  management of severe 
accidents.  The problem of establishing the ambient conditions of a severe accident  to 
important  electrical  components  is  currently  being  studied  as  part  of a  benchmark 
exercise. 
As  regards  probabilistic  safety  assessments,  the  RSWG  has  so  far  concentrated  on 
exchanges of information,  especially  the  PSAs carried  out  in  the  Member States.  In 
future,  the emphasis will  be on the harmonization of methods.  As  regards operational 
safety,  following  the  publication  of a  consensual  report  on  periodic  reassessments 
comparisons will  have to  be extended to reassessments  taking account of the protection 
against  earthquakes.  The exchange of information  will  have  to  be continued  on  the 
practices of modifying installations.  Finally, the important problem of qualifying saft:ty 
software will be broached. '  \0 
Advanced nuclear power plants showing  what will  probably  be  the  first  generation  of 
future plants are at the hub of studies undertaken within the RSWG.  Revolutionary plants 
with different safety features from the current plants are not disregarded  - studies have 
been presented and discussed within the RSWG - but the immediate interest centres on 
evolutionary plants developed by extrapolation from present plants with improved safety 
features.  One example is the REP 2000 programme launched by EDF which is gradually 
being  linked  with  the  Franco-German  EPR  project.  The  exchange  of information 
currently centres around this project and the initial discussions on the safety  principh!s, 
options and rules taken into account.  This proje.ct confirms the need fur harmonization 
of the manufacture and  control  codes and  standards  for the  main  steel  components of 
PWR plants.  The Franco-German comparison of practices, codes and standards for the 
manufacture of reactor  vessels  is  a  starting  point which  should  be extended  to  other 
components and form part of systematic harmonization at European level.  This will be 
based on  pre-normative activities which have been  undertaken for some time and  will 
continue in  the fields of manufacture and in-service inspection, structural  mechanics and 
materials of steel  components in  the primary circuits of plants. 
This is  not a complete list,  the sole aim being to indicate which points warrant the must 
altention at the present time.  While they  might seem fairly disparate at tirst sight,  these 
measures arc all  part of a  "jigsaw" which has already been started to be put together, as 
horne  out  by  the  previous  reports,  especially  the  reports  of  6 April  1987 
(COM(87)96 final) and 23 January  1992 (SEC(92)79 final),  which  will  not be rclurnctl 
to.  The activities of the RSWG tie in  closely with the work of the Nuclear Regulators' 
Working Group (NRWG) which consists solely of the safety authorities. 
In  general, the activities of the RSWG arc upstream of those of the NH.WG  in  which tlw 
more specifically regulatory aspects are dealt with after the exchange or information ano 
establishment of a technical consensus have been handled by the RSWG.  However, the 
respective activities of the RSWG and the NRWG  should  not  be classified  too  rigidly 
since  it  does  not  always  apply.  A  vital  aspect  which  has  to  be  stressed  in  the 
harmonization sought through the network of cooperation and consultation put in  place 
by the Commission as part of the RSWG is that harmonisation and search for equivalence 
between the rules and practices of safety are evolutive and iterative processes dependent 
upon - step by step- technological innovation and the results of research.  Before looking 
more closely at this aspect of Community action, it should be noted that the Commission 
supports  several  promotional  measures  for  possible  European  networks:  EN lQ -
Europc.1.n  Network for  Inspection Qualifications;  AMES  - Action of Reactor Pressure 
Vessel  Materials Irradiation  Effects and Studies;  NESC - Network for Evaluating Steel 
Components.  J  RC  assumes  the coordination of these networks. 
III.  Scientific and technical support 
"The Council reaffirms the importance of technological progress in  relation to the safety 
of  nuclear  installations  and  in  this  connection  invites  the  Member  States  and  the 
Commission to continue and intensify concerted effort through significant joint actions on 
key safety issues.  Thus it underlines the primary importance of nuclear safety research 
and  technological  innovation and  the  need  to continue and  increase  action  undertaken 
within the Community, including the study of future generations of reactors.  This action 
may, where possible, be extended to third countries, notably those of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Republics of the former Soviet Union." '  \\ 
'The safety practices, rules and criteria applied to plants in service were established from 
the outset on  the basis of technical  knowledge available  at the  time.  This  technical 
knowledge generally came from  results of research  programmes  set  up  to identify  the 
physical phenomena at stake,  which were complex more often than  not,  particularly  in 
the case of  accidents.  Accidents to be taken into account in the design of an installation 
were  defined  as  design  basis  accidents  to  cover all  situations.  Where  the available 
knowledge seemed insufficient or uncertain, margins of  conservatism varying in size were 
introduced into the Regulation. 
This situation changed with the results of a number of research programmes,  but it was 
the TMI 2 accident in 1979 which finally called into question the concept of design basis 
accident and led to new  research  programmes  designed  to  assess  existing  margins  in 
respect of more serious accidents than the design basis accident. 
Concertation  and  collaboration  undertaken  in  order  to  promote  the  harmonisation  of 
approaches to safety means, as seen above, that a consensus among the bodies represented 
in  the  RSWG  has  to  be reached  and  should  result  in  the  recognition  of equivalence 
between different options.  This kind of  consensus, or, where possible, the establishment 
of common rules, can only be obtained when the scientific basis, e.g. detailed knowledge 
of physical phenomena, knowledge of material properties and increasingly sophisticated 
methods used to assess  and analyze safety are themselves the result of a consensus.  At 
the end ofthe 1980s a large number of major research programmes on reactor safety were 
nearing completion in the United States and Europe (LOFf, LACE, MARVIKEN, ACE, 
BETA, PHEBUS  SFD, LOBI, etc.) and budgetary restrictions limited major new projects 
to  a  few  rare  experiments  such  as  PHEBUS  PF  (fission  products)  in  France,  with 
participation and financial backing from the Commission and FARO at the JRC Institute  · 
for Safety Technology in lspra.  The Commission was thus aware that extra experimental 
work still had to be done and that there was still much to do to make better use of many 
results  already  available  in  the  Member  States  and  ensure  their  use  at technical  and 
regulatory level.  Accordingly, a reinforced concerted action programme on reactor safety 
was proposed in 1990 and accepted by the Council on 28 November 1991.  Later on this 
programme was  open  to  the  participation of Central and  Eastern  European  Countries 
(PECO).  The general theme of this action is the containment of radioactivity in the event 
of severe accidents and the eight projects implemented cover the following three aspects: 
accident progression analysis; behaviour and qualification of  the containment system;  and 
accidents management and control.  Within each project the method of work consists of 
concertation on the latest scientific results obtained in national or Community programmes 
which  are pooled, analyzed and evaluated jointly.  The funds  made available for each 
project will make for a certain amount of extra experimental work.  The final objective 
of this reinforced concerted action programme will be to contribute on a certain number 
of key safety issues to the establishment of scientific and technical consensus.  Examples 
are the "hydrogen", "source term" and "molten fuel-coolant interactions" projects which 
ought to clarify a number of uncertainties surrounding the risk of  detonation of hydrogen, 
the problems of the retention of fission  products in  the containment system and the risk 
of steam  explosion.  These  are  three  issues  which  could  be  tackled  as  part  of the 
consultation and cooperation procedures within the RSWG to harmonize safety practices 
and rules where the point in question,  for example, is the problem of managing severe 
accidents or taking account of available safety margins for confinement systems to cope 
with the shock waves caused by steam explosion or hydrogen detonation.  This illustrates 
the close links between  the technical  and  regulatory  activities  of the  Commission  and t)... 
nuclear safety.  It should be noted, however, that despite the significant efforts made at 
Community  level  and  at  a  broader  international  level,  as  in  the  CSNI  of the  NEA 
(OECD), the funds set aside for nuclear safety research have constantly dropped both at 
national and at Community level.  This is a worrying situation and the political powers 
keep ignoring the pressing appeals made within the respective fora, in particular the STC 
(Euratom Scientific and Technical Committee), by the specialists concerned. 
The safety of future nuclear power plants is  at the centre of a debate generated  by  the 
Chernobyl accident on the future of nuclear energy.  To counter the pessimism  reigning 
in nuclear circles,  suppliers and electrical  utilities have taken a serious  look at how  to 
improve proven concepts or how to develop new,  more innovative concepts.  The main 
concern was to improve safety and, contrary to  what had happened in the  1960s in  the 
development of LWR  systems,  the  basic  safety  requirements  and  options  formed  the 
foundation  for  the new  solutions  proposed.  Thus,  technological  innovation  put itself 
primarily at the service of safety.  In recent years, the Commission has closely monitored 
these developments and has assigned various  studies in  which the safety aspects of the 
main  projects  in  progress  were  examined.  The  RSWG  has  also  been  kept  regularly 
informed by  the operators and constructors of the specifications and orientations in  the 
EPR project. 
Following the political upheavals in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the 
West's realization of the problems presented by  the safety of nuclear power stations  in 
those countries, one of the main concerns of the Council and the Commission was for the 
urgent practical assistance provided by the Community under the PHARE and T ACIS 
programmes to be accompanied  by a real transfer of the approach  to  safety,  methods, 
practices,  rules and criteria applied by the Community to  help the countries of the East 
gradually  to  bring· the safety  of their installations  up  to  an  equivalent level  to  that  of 
European  installations.  The Commission,  which  does  not  wish  to  limit this  objective 
solely  to  existing  plants  but  also  to  future  generations  of plants,  has  recently  taken 
significant steps in this direction, in the form of a joint study between, on  the one hand, 
the  constructors  and  technical  support  organizations  for  the  Community's  safety 
authorities, as coordinated by EDF and GRS respectively, and, on the other, their Russian 
counterparts.  This is a joint Community-Russian study of how to improve safety in  the 
main reactor systems, the principal objective being to identify joint measures which could 
help to accelerate this improvement and have an impact on the future of nuclear energy 
in Europe.  This analysis will also provide support for a vast operation of technological 
transfer  to  the  Russian  industry,  safety  assessment  establishments  and  research  and 
development institutes  so  that European  know-how can  help  future  Russian  projects. 
Technological innovation and the results of research obtained in the Community form an 
integral part of this transfer of know-how.  The project will  last for a period of around 
three· years and is  thus a major operation  involving about 25  manyears  from  each  side 
(Community and Russia)  for the two parts of the analysis.  In the first part - "Evolution 
of  safety requirements for nuclear power plants" -the safety objectives and practices will 
be identified for a period of some 20 to 30 years and in the second part -"Challenges and 
solutions"  - the areas will be pinpointed in  which such developments and initiatives can 
be expected. IV.  Translation of efforts into regulations 
"The Council requests the Member States to continue - with an active contribution from 
the  Commission - to  ensure  greater  concerted  effort  between  the  national  safety 
authorities in the Community on safety criteria and requirements and on the incorporation 
of the conclusions reached into the practice followed in the Member States,  in order to 
arrive  at  a  system  of safety  criteria  and  requirements  recognized  throughout  the 
Community." 
The Commission's policy of harmonizing safety requirements,  criteria and rules at the 
beginning  of the  1970s,  as  borne  out  by  the  Resolution  of 22 July  1975  on  the 
technological  problems  of nuclear  safety,  is  based  on  systematic  cooperation  and 
concertation with the parties responsible for nuclear safety in the Member States through 
working parties set up by the Commission.  The activities of the Reactor Safety Working 
Group  (RSWG)  were  described  briefly  above;  the  other,  the  Nuclear  Regulators' 
Working Group (NRWG), consisting solely of national regulatory, licensing and control 
authorities,  pursues  the  ultimate  objective  of this  cooperation  and  concertation,  viz. 
recognition  at  Community  level  of a  set  of safety  criteria,  rules  and  requirements. 
Representatives  of the  safety  authorities  of Finland  and  Sweden  also  participate  as 
observers, as for the RSWG, in the work of the NRWG.  The principal results obtained 
are  described  in  the  document  COM(88)788 final  of  24 February  1989  entitled 
"Assurance of the safety  of nuclear power plants".  The work of the  NRWG  and  the 
RSWG has in  the past been closely linked and the work programmes set up by the two 
parties have gone along parallel lines.  For some years now, as a result of external factors 
and in particular the development of relations with the Safety authorities of the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe and  the former Soviet Union,  which will be discussed in 
more detail below, and also the internal factor of establishing a consensus on a growing 
number of subjects, the influence and image of the NRWG has gradually been enhanced. 
In 1992 the methods and work programme of the Group were discussed and redirected. 
In an effort to avoid any confusion between Community harmonization and the problem 
of induced responsibilities,  the Group stressed  the following principles: 
-The  safety  of nuclear  installations  must  remain  the  responsibility  of the  individual 
countries, meaning that there must be a legal framework to regulate nuclear activities and 
designate responsibilities:  the principal responsibility for the safety of  an installation must 
lie with  the operating organization. 
-The safety regulator is responsible for monitoring and implementing the safety objectives 
in accordance with  the laws and regulations. 
The current work programme,  some of the main points of which  will  be indicated as 
examples, leaves more scope than in the past for the final phase of harmonization, which 
is to establish consensus on the points which have led  to detailed technical discussions 
upstream and in particular in the RSWG.  It also takes a systematic approach to general 
problems which at the outset concern only the safety authorities or which refer to how the 
public authorities organize the safety of installations.  The working method employed by 
the  NRWG  makes  consistent  use  of studies  financed  by  the  Commission  and  sets  up 
meetings of specialist task forces which draft questionnaires for safety authorities, process 
the results and make summaries in the group itself.  Attention is drawn to the following: 
,  -Periodic reviews of the safety of nuclear plants have given rise to work, the first stage 
of which was to make an inventory of practices while stressing  differences in approach. At this stage,  particular attention was  paid  to  the work carried out by  the IAEA  in  the 
same field.  The second stage provides for the drafting of a consensus document restricted 
to the essential points. 
-Regulatory  actions  concerning  probabilistic  safety  analysis  has  been  initiated  and  a 
summary made by a consultant on the basis of replies to a questionnaire will be examined 
by  a  task  force  with  representatives  from  seven  European  countries.  The aim  is  to 
establish to  what extent the results  of PSAs can be taken into account in  authorization 
procedures for the entire lifespan of the plant.  The task force will also take account of 
work done by the IAEA and the OECD-CSNI on the same subject. 
-The influence of the regulatory  authorities  on the design  of future plants is  an  actual 
topic,  as  was  seen  above in  the EPR project.  The authorities  lay  down  what safety 
objectives are to be achieved, and then it is for the plant operators and/or constructors to 
draw up detailed criteria and standards;  the latter must also demonstrate to the authorities 
that the safety objectives set out at the outset are met, although what needs to be known 
is  how  and by what procedures the proposals  from  operators or constructors  are to  be 
submitted and accepted by  the safety regulators.  The NRWG has  started  to  tackle this 
problem along these lines without losing sight of OECD-CNRA activities. 
The NRWG has started an in-depth study into the practices and approaches followed  in 
the Member States on "safety culture".  A first point was  to see how the Member States 
understand  this concept and thus  how  they apply  the  fundamental  principles of safety. 
This will be followed by a discussion of current practices by  way of a dialogue between 
safety authorities and operators and the implementation of "safety culture" by operators. 
Work more closely linked with the principles, criteria, codes and standards of safety has 
been undertaken on the application of safety principles to the design of safety systems. 
The work concentrates on the application of  single failure, diversity and reliability criteria 
to  the design of two PWR safety systems chosen as  examples:  the auxiliary feedwater 
system of steam generators  and  the emergency  core cooling  system,  the aim  being  to 
obtain information on how these criteria are interpreted and applied by the various safety 
authorities.  This  operation  is  run  in  close  connection  with  a  series  of exercises  to 
compare the safety rules applied for the design of three modern PWR plants:  Sizewell B 
(UK),  Konvoy  (Germany) and  N4 (FR)  launched within the RSWG. 
These examples  demonstrate  the  efforts  made  to  incorporate  into  the  procedures  and 
practices of  the Member States the results of harmonizing safety criteria and requirements 
obtained by the Commission and the Member States within the NRWG.  The close links 
which now exist between the safety authorities of the Member States and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are discussed  below as part of 
cooperation with Eastern European countries.  Efficient and consistent transfer to these 
countries of  the "safety culture" and the system of methodologies, requirements, rules and 
criteria  involved  will  not  be  possible  unless  this  system  is  recognized  and  applied 
throughout the Community. 
V  .Cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe 
"The Council emphasizes the panicular imponance it attaches to nuclear safety in Europe 
and  therefore  requests  the  Member States  and  the  Commission  to  adopt  as  the 
fundamental  and priority  objective of Community  cooperation  in  the  nuclear field,  in I  1.;-
panicular with  the other European  countries,  especially those  of Central and Eastern 
Europe  and the  Republics of the former  Soviet  Union,  that of bringing  their nuclear 
installations up to safety levels equivalent to those in practice in the Community and to 
facilitate the implementation of  the safety criteria and requirements already recognized 
throughout the Community." 
The  contacts  established  at  the  end  of 1990  between  the  safety  authorities  of the 
Community Member States, Finland and Sweden, as represented in the NRWG, and their 
counterparts in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
rapidly led to the setting up by the Commission in 1991 of the CONCERT (Concertation 
on European Regulatory Tasks) Group for the purpose of  developing cooperation between 
the safety authorities in the Community and in Eastern Europe, the objective being to take 
advantage of the existence of the concertation structures built up in Western Europe in 
the NRWG in order to  improve cooperation.  The three areas proposed for joint work 
were as  follows:  regulatory  bases  and procedures,  regulatory  aspects  of technical and 
operational problems, and assistance programmes in progress.  The intention was through 
the CONCERT Group to provide a broad European  framework for regulatory  matters, 
with a general remit.  The Group's first decision was to prepare a document based on the 
work of a task force and a consultant setting out the objectives of nuclear safety and the 
principles on  which an  effective regulatory regime should  be  based.  This  document, 
entitled "Objectives and requirements of a nuclear safety regime", is intended to help the 
Eastern European countries set up adequate regulatory structures. 
It rapidly  emerged  that  one of the  essential  objectives  of assistance  for  the  Eastern 
European countries in connection with nuclear safety was to transfer to these countries. 
the organizational, procedural and regulatory experience collected in the Community.  At 
the beginning of 1992, at the instigation of the NRWG, the Commission set up, in support 
of the  CONCERT  structure,  the  RAMG  (Regulatory  Assistance  Management  Group) 
made up of the safety authorities participating in the NRWG prepared to provide support 
for  their  counterparts  in  Eastern  Europe  in  the  framework  of technical  assistance 
programmes funded by the Community.  The RAMG supervises assistance activities and 
advises the Commission on proposals  made in  this connection.  More particularly,  the 
RAMG's task is to define, organize and implement support for the regulatory authorities 
in  the countries of Central and Eastern  Europe and  the former Soviet Union,  help  the 
Commission in the establishment of  a regional assistance programme for these countries, 
advise it on  requests  from  the recipient countries  so as to  maximize the  benefits,  and 
examine and evaluate the results of the assistance programmes. 
On the basis of this  two-tier consultative structure,  consisting of CONCERT, in  which 
the broad policy options are discussed by all the authorities, and the RAMG, in which the 
safety authorities of the member countries of the NRWG prepared to get involved in  the 
assistance  programmes  discuss  practical  measures,  the Commission  has  established  a 
consistent concertation and cooperation system for all matters concerning the regulatory 
aspects of nuclear safety.  The assistance programmes funded by the Community (PHARE 
and  TACIS)  benefit  directly  from  the  advice  and  suggestions  emerging  from  the 
cooperation established in this structure, and in order to formalize it the Commission has 
drawn  up  a  Memorandum  of Understanding  spelling  out the  respective  roles  of the 
CONCERT Group and the RAMG. lb 
The Memorandum of Understanding specifies the type of measures to be carried out on 
the basis of contractual links between the Community,  with the agreement of the safety 
authorities in the recipient States, and the Community bodies taking part in the assistance 
programmes.  Among the measures carried out, mention should be made of "exploratory 
missions" to prepare the assistance measures by helping the recipient countries to identify 
and formulate their regulatory requirements.  These missions are proposed by the RAMG 
at  the  request  of  interested  countries.  For  each  mission  a  representative  of  a 
Member State's safety authority is designated as coordinator and spokesman vis-a-vis the 
recipient  country's  safety  authority,  and  several  experts  from  other  Member States 
together with the coordinator form the team which goes to the spot to examine specific 
problem raised by the applicant State.  A report based on the opinions formed during the 
mission  and  on  the  discussions  held  with  the  regulatory  body  visited  sets  out 
recommendations and  identifies the successive  measures  proposed.  The measures  are 
subsequently  incorporated  into  the  Commission's  assistance  programme  following 
consultation  with  the  RAMG.  The Community  organizations  which  take  part  in  the 
exploratory missions are the safety bodies which draw up proposals for  licences and/or 
regulations, assisted in certain cases by the technical organizations providing support for 
the safety authorities (TSOs -Technical Safety Organizations), e.g. CEA-IPSN in France 
where the safety authority is the DSIN (Industry Ministry),  GRS in Germany where the 
safety  authority  is  the BMU.  So  far,  exploratory  missions  have  been  carried  out in 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia,  Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Strictly  speaking  assistance  projects  are carried  out  by  groupings  of several  "safety 
authority" bodies or for assistance relating to specific safety evaluations by groupings of 
several technical support organizations.  It will be noted that the final objective set by the 
Council is to endeavour to bring the nuclear installations in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former  Soviet Union  up to  safety  levels equivalent to  those  in 
practice in  the  Community.  As  far  as  strictly  regulatory  matters  are concerned,  this 
objective is twofold and the prospects of success are not identical in each case.  Providing 
assistance to the safety authorities involves (a) transferring a system of principles, criteria, 
safety rules and evaluation methods and (b) transferring  practices, regulations and laws 
concerning  the  organization  of the public  authorities  for  the  approval  and  control  of 
nuclear installations. 
As far as the first point is concerned, the beneficiaries of the assistance programmes are, 
within the body representing the safety authority, and whatever the country in question, 
safety specialists with whom technical collaboration has been effectively established and 
who are convinced of the need for a more extensive technical regulatory arsenal.  As far 
as the second point is concerned, the beneficiaries are always the same and they are no 
less convinced of  the need to establish governmental structures guaranteeing independence 
vis-a-vis the political and economic authorities for those with technical responsibility for 
safety,  but  they  are  not  the  only  ones  since  ultimately  they  have  to  persuade  the 
authorities in  question  to accept administrative and  financial changes.  The difficulties 
encountered in this respect have been emphasized by certain representatives of  the Eastern 
European countries on a number of occasions during exploratory missions,  in  particular 
the representatives of the countries of the former Soviet Union during the meeting of the 
CONCERT Group held in Brussels  in  December 1992. On the sidelines of this meeting a seminar was held on the "legal framework for nuclear 
safety"  and  the  problems  presented  by  the creation  from  scratch  in  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe  of a  complete  legal  framework,  or  simply  adjustments  to  the  legal 
framework or to the existing administrative framework,  were raised and the pessimism 
of certain delegates was  noted.  Generally speaking,  it has to be acknowledged that the 
transfer of the regulatory know-how acquired in the Community to the safety authorities 
of the recipient countries is progressing satisfactorily at a technical level and the pressure 
exerted by the West Europeans is appreciated by their counterparts in Eastern  Europe. 
However, this transfer on a technical level will not be fully effective unless there is also 
strong  political  pressure  to ensure that the  changes  needed  to  the  legislation  and  the 
administrative structures of the States concerned are implemented:  the transmission  by 
the Commission of the reports of the exploratory missions approved by the RAMG to the 
highest governmental bodies of the State concerned is a first step in  the right direction. 
The first  meeting  of the  CONCERT  Group  outside Brussels  was  held  in  Moscow  in 
April  1993.  Apart  from  its  contribution  to  preparing  the  Community  assistance 
programme and monitoring its implementation, the Moscow meeting enabled a very open 
discussion to be held on  the delicate matter of "periodical safety reviews"  and thus  help 
to  further the essential aim of the Group,  viz.  establishing a mechanism  for  long-term 
pan-European  cooperation.  This  discussion  was  based  on  a  study  funded  by  the 
Commission  concerning  practices  in  this  connection  in  Western  Europe.  The oldest 
power stations in particular are concerned. 
VI.  International cooperation 
"The Council encourages the Member States and the Commission to act in a coordinated 
manner in international fora on the basis of the achievements reached in the Community 
towards a system of internationally accepted nuClear safety criteria and requirements,  in 
particular in  the framework of the International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA)." 
While  collaborating  actively  with  the  IAEA  and  with  the  CNRA  (OECD-NEA),  the 
Commission  is  endeavouring  to  help  the  Community  Member  States  reach  common 
positions  in  the  framework  of these  international  organizations  so  that  Community 
achievements are taken into account wherever possible at a wider international level. 
It should  be recalled  that at the general conference of the IAEA in  September 1991  a 
number of  general objectives were set:  to implement a harmonized international approach 
to all aspects of nuclear safety, to prepare the ground for an international convention on 
nuclear safety,  to  develop  a common basis  on  which  to judge the acceptability of the 
safety of power stations built in accordance with old criteria,  to consider a complete and 
transparent process with regard to safety with the aim of achieving a high level of safety 
in all nuclear installations in operation, and to set up a group of experts to develop safety 
principles for the design of future power stations.  Work on the international convention 
has begun at the IAEA and it would seem that in the first instance a separate protocol on 
the safety of nuclear power stations will be drawn up. 
On a number of specific topics, the activities carried out within the IAEA and the OECD 
are  closely  connected  with  the  activities  of the  Commission's  RSWG  and  NRWG. 
Mention  should  be  made  in  particular  of the  revision  of certain  NUSS  codes,  the 
incorporation of the NUSS codes into national regulations,  the IAEA-INSAG-4 report 18 
on  safety  culture,  the  IAEA's  fundamental  safety  principles,  and  the  work  of the 
CNRA-OECD  on  the  safety  requirements  of future  power  stations  and  that  of the 
CSNI-OECD-NEA on safety-related R&D activities.  All these matters are discussed in 
detail  in  Community fora,  and  the conclusions  are taken  into account to  a very  great 
extent  by  the  Member  States'  representatives  when  they  attend  IAEA  and  OECD 
meetings. 
There is active direct cooperation between the Commission and the IAEA with regard to 
the safety of installations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.  The Commission  takes part,  with its  own experts,  in  the OSART and 
ASSET missions organized by the Agency in these countries and funds the participation 
of experts  from  Community  Member  States.  Likewise,  the  Agency  is  invited  to 
participate as an observer in the activities of the CONCERT Group. 
Vll.  Trends, assessment and objectives of the Commission's activities 
The  Council  Resolution  of  22 July  1975  committed  the  Member  States  and  the 
Commission  to  a  gradual  process  of harmonizing  safety  practices  and  rules  in  the 
Community.  The Resolution of 18 June 1992 updates and strengthens the Community's 
role in  the light of one of the key aspects of safety,  namely the awareness at the end of 
the  1980s of the existence of a small  but not negligible probability of severe accidents 
which could have repercussions worldwide.  In addition, while confirming the Community 
objectives set out in the 1975 Resolution,  it stressed  the need to  transfer to and promote 
acceptance by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
of the  know-how  and  experience  acquired  at  European  Community  level.  At  the 
beginning of 1993  it can  be said  that the  first  steps  taken  towards achieving  the  latter 
objective are going in the right direction.  With regard to the measures carried out since 
1975 at Community level, it has to be acknowledged that in a climate largely adverse to 
the development of  nuclear energy, the harmonization of  nuclear safety practices and rules 
is progressing satisfactorily in Europe.  In this connection, it is worth examining in closer 
detail the development of cooperation and concertation between the parties involved in 
nuclear  safety,  and  in  particular  the  safety  authorities,  the  nuclear  utilities  and  the 
constructors. 
In the 1970s the beginnings of Community activities relating to the safety of installations 
were  slow  and  difficult:  the  Member  States  were  more  inclined  to  complete  their 
plant-construction  programmes  without  having  to  worry  about  the  constraints  which 
would have been placed on  them  by  rigorous harmonization at Community level.  The 
1980s saw concertation take a more systematic and active direction.  The TMI accident, 
which sparked off a revival in nuclear safety research programmes, provided an impetus 
for greater international cooperation on research,  entailing better concertation  between 
those responsible  for  safety in the Member States.  At the end of the  1980s,  bilateral 
cooperation  agreements  were concluded  between  France and  the  Federal Republic of 
Germany  involving  research  centres  and  plant  constructors  (Siemens-Framatome), 
operators  and  safety  authorities  or  their  technical  support  organizations 
(GRS-CEA-IPSN).  With  the  development  of a  joint  plant  project  (EPR)  and  the 
establishment of European specifications (EUR - European  Utilities Requirements) and 
the prospects opened up by the Single European Market of 1993, this bilateral cooperation 
had a certain knock-on effect from which, as has already been seen above, the activities 
at Community level relating to  the harmonization of safety  practices,  rules and  criteria I~ 
have already benefited and will continue to benefit. 
At  the  end  of the  1980s  the  Chemobyl  accident  had  maJor  repercussions  for  the 
development of Community nuclear safety activities.  Awareness of the interdependence 
between the future of nuclear energy in the West and the safety of installations in the East 
has encouraged greater cohesion between the parties involved in safety in the Community 
who have gradually  regarded  themselves  as  having joint responsibility  vis-a-vis  their 
counterparts in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The recent political upheavals in these countries, rcsulling in  the establishment of major 
Community assistance programmes (PHARE and TACIS) have sparklXl off a  revival in 
intra-Community cooperation and concertation.  The assistance projects launched since 
1991  are  more  often  than  not  projects  to  evaluate  the  situation,  analyze  safety  and 
improve .control and safety systems.  To meet a very considerable demand and provide 
the  recipient  countries  with  consistent  assistance  offering  all  the  necessary  safety 
guarantees, the Commission has encouraged groupings of European bodies providing the 
assistance:  nuclear  utilities  (TPEG),  safety  authorities  (RAM)  and  their  support 
organizations (TSOs), and plant constructors (ENAC).  Depending on the case in  point, 
the  group  includes  the  bodies  in  the  interested  Mcmher  States  belonging  to  a  given 
category,  e.g.  the  safety  authorities or the  TSO,  and  in  other cases  for  example  for 
certain industrial projects implemented under the TACIS  1991  programme the group only 
includes some of the parties or is  made up of a  limited  number of plant  suppliers  or 
electrical  utilities  acting jointly on  their own  initiative.  This  type of collaboration  is 
extremely fruitful and since ultimately it is a question of dealing with safety problems the 
projects carried out provide the European organizations with a  unique opportunity for a 
joint  practical  harmonization  exercise.  While  all  the  activities  launched  by  the 
. Commission with the help of the RSWG and the NRWG are aimed at  the harmoni1.ation 
at European level of safety practices and rules through a more or less abstract process of 
discussion and comparison of  national positions, the implementation of assistance projects 
gives the same organizations, which also participate actively in the activities of the RSWG 
and the NRWG, an opportunity to apply in practice the results of Community cooperation 
for  the  benefit  of the  recipients  of the  assistance.  The  resulting  concertatiun  and 
operation established in a very practical way between the parties jointly responsible for 
a given project can ultimately only benefit the Community activities, the success of which 
is indirectly furthered  by the assistance programmes. 
In  this context favourable to the Commission's desired policy, in  the wake of the work 
carried  out jointly in  the context of the  EPR project,  the  EUR  specifications  and  the 
assistance  programmes,  there  is  likely  to  be a  knock-on  effect  at  Community  level, 
gradually prompting the safety authorities in  the Member States, the TSOs, the electrical 
utilities and the plant suppliers to discuss and reach a consensus on  the specific safety 
problems  raised  in  the Member States with  regard  to  operational  safety and  licensing 
problems.  This would strengthen cohesion and solidarity between those responsible fur 
safety within the Community and would contribute to greater puhlic acceptance of nuckar 
energy. 
Following on from this examination of  the various aspects of Commission activities in the 
field  of reactor safety,  it  would seem  to be useful  to  examine them  in  relation  to  the 
general objectives pursued since 1975, in the light of the 1975 Resolution which advocates 
the establishment of a  safety  system  recognized  throughout  the  Community  which  is 
capable  of  ensuring  a  satisfactory  standard  of  protection  for  the  public  and  the •  20 
environment against  the  risks arising from  the use of nuclear energy. 
This fundamental  objective has gradually been achieved since  1975  in  three areas:  the 
organization of safety, particularly as regards the public authorities, the safety evaluation 
methods,  and the technical regulations. 
This is no place to go into the details of what the Community has achieved since  1975. 
Numerous progress reports have given an account of the matters on  which a consensus 
has been reached.  However, the following is a tentative assessment: 
-With regard to the organization of safety, the achievements are very considerable, and 
the recent  report already  mentioned above,  entitled  "Objectives and  requirements  of a 
nuclear safety regulatory  regime", which could be supplemented and improved, gives a 
fairly complete overview of the principles on  which there is  a European consensus. 
-As regards the safety evaluation  methods,  the report COM(88)788 entitled  "J\ssur~wcc 
of the  safety of nuclear  power plants - Objectives and  methods"  will  also constitute a 
virtually complete consensus document once it  has been  updated  to  take account of thc 
4Uestion  of severe accidents. 
-Where  technical  regulations  are concerned,  the  situation  is  complex  because  of the 
various  hierarchies of regulations,  necessitating  in  some cases initiatives on  the  part  of 
industrial  operator.'\,  and  in  view of the  very  broad  range of problems  to  he  taken  inttl 
account in  the various phases of the existence of a power station,  namely site sekcttott, 
design,  commissioning,  operation and decommissioning.  The 1981  document entitled 
"Safety principles  for  light-water-reactor  nuclear  power  plants"  (COM(81)519 final) 
represents an important milestone, however, by listing the fundamental principles and the 
general safety principles recognized at Community level, and mapping out future activities 
relating to safety requirements as well as codes and standards. 
The 1998 document entitled "Assurance of the safety of nuclear power plants - Objectives 
and  methods"  indicates that  the safety  levels achieved  in  the Community countries arc 
practically  equivalent,  while  indicating  the  areas,  essentially  severe  accidents,  wht•rc 
progress still  needs to be made. 
At  present,  with  reference to power stations in  operation or planned,  it  can be said  that 
considerable progress has been made.  Listing the points which over the next  four  years 
will comprise the revised work programme of the RSWG and NRWG will giw some i<.lca 
of what  remains  to  he  done  to  establish  a  safety  system  recognit.ed  throughout  the 
Community. 
Over these four  years,  efforts should focus  in  particular on the following areas: 
-Codes and standards: practical application of the safety codes (NUSS-IAEA); industrial, 
manufacturing and control  codes - the  work carried  out in  conjunction  with  the  EPR 
project  will  make it  possible  to  identify  the  needs  where  the development of spccitic 
standards is concerned; and the certification of components.  The certification of safety 
software will  be covered separately. 
-Evaluation of safety margins:  problems concerning the bursting of steam generator tuht·s 
and  the  resistance of containment systems should be studied  in  gre.ater  detail. -Severe accidents:  attention will focus on the management of accidents and on realistic 
source term and containment performance evaluations. 
-Probabilistic  studies:  the taking  into account of probabilistic  analysis  methods  in  the 
regulatory process will be examined in close connexion with the activities carried out by 
the JRC in this area.  · 
-Operational  safety:  safety  reviews  and  practices  relating  to  the  modification  of 
installations should result in a consensus document. 
-Safety principles:  the problems rais¢ by their practical application will be examined. 
'  '•  '  .  .  -.  .  ·. 
:However complete it rriay· be, the safety system gradually established following a complex 
process of consultation, discussion and concertation which has been conducted for  more 
than 20 years will not bring this process  to an end. 
Absolute safety is as  utopian an objective as absolute health, since safety can always be 
improved  on,  and  at  a  time  when  technological  progress  is  being  made  constantly 
improving safety  fi1USt  be a permanent objective for  the responsible  authorities,  which 
must  ensure  that  adequate  resources  are  available  and  used  wisely.  Community 
concertation:in relation to existing installations should take research results into account 
as long as  there are objective reasons to continue with the research.  As regards future 
generations of power plants,  technological innovation should always  be examined from 
the point of view of safety and be designed promote safety. 
Over and above the safety  system  being  established,  the  ultimate objective  will  be  to 
achieve a genuine Community safety culture progressing  throughout Europe. 
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